d he is confident enough to mock the U.N. Security Council without fear of reprisal. He sees his master plan coming together, and so do his neighbors. And that is where the problem lies.

The Sunni governments in Saudi Arabia and Jordan are nervous. They have lost the buffer of Saddam Hussein's Iraq and are now faced with increasing Shiite power in the region. Saudi Arabia has now essentially admitted as much. The question is whether the nervousness over Shiite power will translate into hostile action. The statement by Obaid would seem to indicate that we are closer to that point than ever before. And if the Sunnis see their longtime dominance of the Middle East slipping away, the sectarian violence in Iraq could easily spread to neighboring nations,

As Iran continues to position itself as the most powerful nation in the Middle East, a new Shiite dominance is emerging in a region traditionally controlled by Sunni Muslims. With the deposing of Saddam Hussein's Sunni regime in Iraq, a Shiite majority has begun to consolidate power within a government expected to have close ties to the ruling clerics in neighboring Iran.

Throw in the rising popularity and power of Iranian-sponsored Hezbollah in Lebanon and nearby Sunni nations are growing increasingly uneasy about what is happening to the balance of power in the region. As that uneasiness grows, so do the prospects for an all-out Shiite-Sunni war in the Middle East.

The private intelligence company Strategic Forecasting, Inc. recently quoted Nawaf Obaid, managing director of the Saudi National Security Assessment Project and Saudi top strategic adviser as saying that the Kingdom would use money, oil, and support for Sunni militants to thwart Iranian efforts to dominate Iraq in the wake of a U.S. military withdrawal.

Writing in the Washington Post, Obaid did concede that such overt support of minority Sunnis in Iraq against a Shiite majority could lead to a wider regional war. However, he wrote, "So be it: The consequences of inaction are far worse." Now, officially the Saudi government has distanced itself from Obaid's comments, and has cancelled its contract with him. But reports from the region, including comments in the Iraq Study Group's findings, increasingly suggest that such support for Iraq's Sunnis is in fact happening.

This is the new reality in the Middle East. Iran saw an opportunity that it could not pass up when the United States became bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan. The radical clerics and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad seized the moment to assert Iranian power and influence in an effort to position Iran as the major player in the region.

The Iranian strategy has three parts, which I have written about before: pursuing nuclear technology without regard to any demands made by the United Nations, using Hezbollah to confront Israel while gaining power and influence in Lebanon, and sponsoring militias and death squads in Iraq to consolidate Shiite power and keep the United States occupied in an increasingly violent insurgency.

So far, the strategy has worked beautifully. Iran's defiance of the United Nations Security Council has been met with diplomatic delays by appeasement-minded France and with the blocking of effective sanctions by Russia, and to some degree, China. Hezbollah fought Israel to a standstill on the battlefield and has pushed the Lebanese government dangerously close to collapse, all the while increasing the influence of its Iranian sponsors. And sectarian violence in Iraq is rapidly spinning out of control as Sunnis are ever so slowly squeezed out of Iraq's future.

At this point, the Iranians are doing quite well. Ahmadinejad is confident enough in his position to write ridiculous letters to President Bush and the American people, and he is confident enough to mock the U.N. Security Council without fear of reprisal. He sees his master plan coming together, and so do his neighbors. And that is where the problem lies.

The Sunni governments in Saudi Arabia and Jordan are nervous. They have lost the buffer of Saddam Hussein's Iraq and are now faced with increasing Shiite power in the region. Saudi Arabia has now essentially admitted as much. The question is whether the nervousness over Shiite power will translate into hostile action. The statement by Obaid would seem to indicate that we are closer to that point than ever before. And if the Sunnis see their longtime dominance of the Middle East slipping away, the sectarian violence in Iraq could easily spread to neighboring nations, r

awaf Obaid, managing director of the Saudi National Security Assessment Project and Saudi top strategic adviser as saying that the Kingdom would use money, oil, and support for Sunni militants to thwart Iranian efforts to dominate Iraq in the wake of a U.S. military withdrawal.

Writing in the Washington Post, Obaid did concede that such overt support of minority Sunnis in Iraq against a Shiite majority could lead to a wider regional war. However, he wrote, "So be it: The consequences of inaction are far worse." Now, officially the Saudi government has distanced itself from Obaid's comments, and has cancelled its contract with him. But reports from the region, including comments in the Iraq Study Group's findings, increasingly suggest that such support for Iraq's Sunnis is in fact happening.

This is the new reality in the Middle East. Iran saw an opportunity that it could not pass up when the United States became bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan. The radical clerics and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad seized the moment to assert Iranian power and influence in an effort to position Iran as the major player in the region.

The Iranian strategy has three parts, which I have written about before: pursuing nuclear technology without regard to any demands made by the United Nations, using Hezbollah to confront Israel while gaining power and influence in Lebanon, and sponsoring militias and death squads in Iraq to consolidate Shiite power and keep the United States occupied in an increasingly violent insurgency.

So far, the strategy has worked beautifully. Iran's defiance of the United Nations Security Council has been met with diplomatic delays by appeasement-minded France and with the blocking of effective sanctions by Russia, and to some degree, China. Hezbollah fought Israel to a standstill on the battlefield and has pushed the Lebanese government dangerously close to collapse, all the while increasing the influence of its Iranian sponsors. And sectarian violence in Iraq is rapidly spinning out of control as Sunnis are ever so slowly squeezed out of Iraq's future.

At this point, the Iranians are doing quite well. Ahmadinejad is confident enough in his position to write ridiculous letters to President Bush and the American people, and he is confident enough to mock the U.N. Security Council without fear of reprisal. He sees his master plan coming together, and so do his neighbors. And that is where the problem lies.

The Sunni governments in Saudi Arabia and Jordan are nervous. They have lost the buffer of Saddam Hussein's Iraq and are now faced with increasing Shiite power in the region. Saudi Arabia has now essentially admitted as much. The question is whether the nervousness over Shiite power will translate into hostile action. The statement by Obaid would seem to indicate that we are closer to that point than ever before. And if the Sunnis see their longtime dominance of the Middle East slipping away, the sectarian violence in Iraq could easily spread to neighboring nations,

t for Iraq's Sunnis is in fact happening.

This is the new reality in the Middle East. Iran saw an opportunity that it could not pass up when the United States became bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan. The radical clerics and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad seized the moment to assert Iranian power and influence in an effort to position Iran as the major player in the region.

The Iranian strategy has three parts, which I have written about before: pursuing nuclear technology without regard to any demands made by the United Nations, using Hezbollah to confront Israel while gaining power and influence in Lebanon, and sponsoring militias and death squads in Iraq to consolidate Shiite power and keep the United States occupied in an increasingly violent insurgency.

So far, the strategy has worked beautifully. Iran's defiance of the United Nations Security Council has been met with diplomatic delays by appeasement-minded France and with the blocking of effective sanctions by Russia, and to some degree, China. Hezbollah fought Israel to a standstill on the battlefield and has pushed the Lebanese government dangerously close to collapse, all the while increasing the influence of its Iranian sponsors. And sectarian violence in Iraq is rapidly spinning out of control as Sunnis are ever so slowly squeezed out of Iraq's future.

At this point, the Iranians are doing quite well. Ahmadinejad is confident enough in his position to write ridiculous letters to President Bush and the American people, and he is confident enough to mock the U.N. Security Council without fear of reprisal. He sees his master plan coming together, and so do his neighbors. And that is where the problem lies.

The Sunni governments in Saudi Arabia and Jordan are nervous. They have lost the buffer of Saddam Hussein's Iraq and are now faced with increasing Shiite power in the region. Saudi Arabia has now essentially admitted as much. The question is whether the nervousness over Shiite power will translate into hostile action. The statement by Obaid would seem to indicate that we are closer to that point than ever before. And if the Sunnis see their longtime dominance of the Middle East slipping away, the sectarian violence in Iraq could easily spread to neighboring nations,

ent insurgency.

So far, the strategy has worked beautifully. Iran's defiance of the United Nations Security Council has been met with diplomatic delays by appeasement-minded France and with the blocking of effective sanctions by Russia, and to some degree, China. Hezbollah fought Israel to a standstill on the battlefield and has pushed the Lebanese government dangerously close to collapse, all the while increasing the influence of its Iranian sponsors. And sectarian violence in Iraq is rapidly spinning out of control as Sunnis are ever so slowly squeezed out of Iraq's future.

At this point, the Iranians are doing quite well. Ahmadinejad is confident enough in his position to write ridiculous letters to President Bush and the American people, and he is confident enough to mock the U.N. Security Council without fear of reprisal. He sees his master plan coming together, and so do his neighbors. And that is where the problem lies.

The Sunni governments in Saudi Arabia and Jordan are nervous. They have lost the buffer of Saddam Hussein's Iraq and are now faced with increasing Shiite power in the region. Saudi Arabia has now essentially admitted as much. The question is whether the nervousness over Shiite power will translate into hostile action. The statement by Obaid would seem to indicate that we are closer to that point than ever before. And if the Sunnis see their longtime dominance of the Middle East slipping away, the sectarian violence in Iraq could easily spread to neighboring nations,

d he is confident enough to mock the U.N. Security Council without fear of reprisal. He sees his master plan coming together, and so do his neighbors. And that is where the problem lies.

The Sunni governments in Saudi Arabia and Jordan are nervous. They have lost the buffer of Saddam Hussein's Iraq and are now faced with increasing Shiite power in the region. Saudi Arabia has now essentially admitted as much. The question is whether the nervousness over Shiite power will translate into hostile action. The statement by Obaid would seem to indicate that we are closer to that point than ever before. And if the Sunnis see their longtime dominance of the Middle East slipping away, the sectarian violence in Iraq could easily spread to neighboring nations, resulting in a full-blown war in the Middle East.